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Why do Firms Engage in Multi-sourcing?

by

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Abstract

We provide an explanation for multi-sourcing, which is often found in the real world and refers to the situation where a final goods producer acquires homogenous components from different suppliers. In the presence of imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing helps to deter entry by the suppliers into the final goods market and enhances profitability of the outsourcing firm.

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Keywords: Entry, Imitation, Multi-sourcing

Outline

1. *Introduction*
2. *Outsourcing to a single firm*
3. *Outsourcing to multiple firms*
4. *Conclusion*

Non-Technical Summary

Empirical evidence suggests that a firm often procures homogenous products from different suppliers. While a great deal of attention has been paid to show the rationale and the effects of international outsourcing, the multi-sourcing activity, which refers to the situation where a final goods producer acquires homogenous components from different suppliers, did not get much attention. We show that, in the presence of knowledge transfer and imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing helps to protect the outsourcing firm by eliminating the suppliers' incentive for entry in the final goods market. Thus, multi-sourcing acts as an entry deterrence strategy.

1. Introduction

Empirical evidence suggests that a firm often procures homogenous products from different suppliers. For example, Mattel, a premier toy brand based in the US, purchases from a large number of third-party manufacturers across countries such as the US, Mexico, Brazil, Asia (including China and India), New Zealand, and Australia. Motorola, a leading technology firm in communication, relies heavily on component suppliers including Toppoly Optoelectronics Corp., Silitek and Compeq Manufacturing. It is reported that Motorola, in 2008, will outsource 75 million to 80 million handsets to original design manufacturers (ODMs), with more than 50 million devices outsourced to Compal Communications and the remainder contracted to Chi Mei Communications System (*DigiTimes*, 2007). Other examples abound.

While a great deal of attention has been paid to show the rationale and the effects of international outsourcing,¹ the multi-sourcing activity, which refers to the situation where a final goods producer acquires homogenous components from different suppliers, did not get much attention. We show that, in the presence of knowledge transfer and imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing helps to protect the outsourcing firm by eliminating the suppliers' incentive for entry in the final goods market. Thus, multi-sourcing acts as an entry deterrence strategy. Two important ingredients of our analysis, viz., knowledge transfer and imitation under outsourcing, are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Pack and Saggi, 2001). It is often the case that a buyer needs to transfer detail production knowledge to the suppliers, which can imitate the technology and create the threat of competition in the buyer's markets.

¹ See, Glass and Saggi (2001), Pack and Saggi (2001), Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2003), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Jones (2005) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2008) for some recent works on outsourcing.

Our reason for multi-sourcing is different from the *hold-up* problem highlighted in the property-right literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986). It may also worth mentioning that, in contrast to Pack and Saggi (2001), where *double marginalization*, due to a linear pricing under outsourcing, creates the incentive for multi-sourcing, the non-linear payment schemes in our analysis eliminate double marginalization under outsourcing.

2. Outsourcing to a single firm

Consider a two-period model of a world economy with two countries, called country A and country B . Assume that, at the beginning of period 1, there is a firm, called firm a , in country A , who owns a technology for a particular product. Firm a can produce the product at the constant marginal cost c_m , thus earning $\pi_a^t(c_m)$ in each period t by selling the product in the world market, where $t = 1, 2$. We assume same demand for the product in both periods. Hence, the total profit of firm a is

$$\sum_{t=1}^2 \pi_a^t(c_m) = 2\pi_a(c_m). \text{ For simplicity, we do not discount future profits.}$$

Assume that there is a firm, called firm b , in country B , who does not have the technology to produce the product, yet, given the technology, is able to produce the product at the constant marginal cost c_b , with $c_m > c_b$, where $c_b = 0$, for simplicity. Hence, firm B enjoys a lower cost of production, which creates the incentive for outsourcing by firm a .

If firm b produces the product, the monopoly profit generated in each period is $\pi_a^t(0)$, with $\pi_a^t(0) > \pi_a^t(c_m)$. We normalize the reservation payoff of firm b to zero, for simplicity. Hence, firm a can outsource the product to firm b against a fee of

$\pi_a^t(0)$ to be paid in each period. We assume that firm a gets the payment separately in each period. Financial constraint faced by firm b may justify this assumption.

So far, we did not consider imitation by the supplier, which is firm b . In the absence of imitation by the supplier, it is optimal for firm a to outsource production to firm b against a per-period payment of $\pi_a^t(0)$. In this situation, the total profit of firm a is $\sum_{t=1}^2 \pi_a^t(0) = 2\pi_a(0)$, and there is no need for multi-sourcing in this benchmark case of no imitation. Hence, our analysis differs from Pack and Saggi (2001), where the outsourcing firm cannot extract the entire surplus from outsourcing, and the incentive for multiple-sourcing remains under no imitation by the supplier.

Let us now consider imitation by the supplier. We assume that firm b requires one period to imitate the technology of firm a if firm a outsources to firm b . After imitation, firm b can compete with firm a with a homogeneous product. However, firm b needs to incur an entry cost I , if it enters the market.

We consider the following game. At the beginning of period 1, firm a offers an outsourcing contract to firm b specifying the payments for periods 1 and 2, should firm b uses the technology of firm a . Firm b decides whether or not to accept the offer. If firm b accepts the offer, it produces the product by using firm a 's technology, and makes the payment to firm a after period 1. Since firm b imitates the technology during period 1, at the beginning of period 2, it decides whether or not to enter the product-market (and breaks the contract with firm a).² Firm b enters the market if its net profit is higher under entry than no-entry and continuing the contract with firm a .

² For simplicity, we normalize the cost of breaking up a contract to zero. If there is a cost of breaking up the contract, given the possibility of imitation, firm b can always contract with firm a separately in each period, if the cost of contracting (which is also normalized to zero in our analysis, for simplicity) is not very high.

If firm b rejects firm a 's offer in period 1, firm a produces the product and earns profit accordingly.³ We solve the game through backward induction.

Under imitation by firm b , the threat of competition restricts profit extraction by firm a . Hence, while offering the contract at the beginning of period 1, firm a needs to offer a period-specific contract which discourages firm b from entering the market, since competition in the product market reduces the industry profit and the profit of firm a .

Let us first determine the profit of firm b in period 2, when it produces with firm a 's technology in period 1 but competes with firm a in period 2. The net profits of firms a and b in period 2 are respectively $\pi_a^2(c_m, 0)$ and $\pi_b^2(c_m, 0) - I > 0$. The first (second) argument in $\pi_i^2(c_m, 0)$, $i = a, b$, shows the marginal cost of firm a (firm b). Hence, in order to prevent firm b from entering the market, the outsourcing contract should leave firm b with a positive profit of $\pi_b^2(c_m, 0) - I$. Therefore, the price paid by firm b in period 2 should not exceed $\pi_a^1(0) - (\pi_b^2(c_m, 0) - I)$. Note that $\pi_a^1(0) - \pi_b^2(c_m, 0) > \pi_a^2(c_m, 0)$, i.e., the gross industry profit (which includes the entry-cost) is higher under monopoly than under duopoly, and this is always true for homogeneous products.

Since there is no imitation in period 1, the payment under outsourcing for period 1 would be $\pi_a^1(0)$. The profits of firms a and b in period 1 only are respectively $\pi_a^1(0)$ and 0.

Therefore, at the beginning of period 1, firm a offers a contract specifying that firm b pays $\pi_a^1(0)$ and $\pi_a^1(0) - \pi_b^2(c_m, 0) + I$ in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Note

³ Since imitation is not a credible threat if the offer is given in period 2, and because firm a can extract the entire profit generated in firm b , if firm b rejects the offer in period 1, there is no reason for it to accept an offer in period 2. Hence, if the offer in period 1 is rejected, there is no offer in period 2.

that firm b cannot be better off either by rejecting this offer in period 1 or by cancelling the contract in period 2 and entering the product market. The total net profits of firms a and b are respectively $2\pi_a^1(0) - \pi_b^2(c_m, 0) + I$ and $\pi_b^2(c_m, 0) - I$.

It must be noted that, since imitation requires one period, firm a may want to outsource only in period 2. In this situation, firm a earns a total profit of $\pi_a^1(c_m) + \pi_a^2(0)$, while the total profit of firm b is zero. However, outsourcing at the beginning of period 1 dominates deferred-outsourcing if

$$\pi_a^1(0) + I > \pi_b^2(c_m, 0) + \pi_a^1(c_m). \quad (1)$$

Whether firm a outsources in period 1 or in period 2, in the presence of imitation by firm b , the total profit of firm a under outsourcing is lower compared to the situation of no imitation by firm b .

3. Outsourcing to multiple firms

Now assume that firm a decides to outsource in period 1, but, instead of outsourcing to firm b only, it outsources to two symmetric firms, b and c . Neither b nor c has the technology to produce the product of firm a , but both of them are able to produce it after getting the technology of firm a . Both firms b and c require one period to imitate the technology of firm a , and each of them requires the entry-cost I to enter the product-market.

We consider the following game. At the beginning of period 1, firm a offers period-specific contracts to both firms b and c , who decide non-cooperatively whether or not to accept the contract. If a supplier accepts the offer, it imitates the technology during period 1, and decides at the beginning of period 2 whether to enter the market or to continue with firm a 's contract. If both firms b and c have accepted

the offer, they take the market-entry decision in period 2 simultaneously and non-cooperatively. If either firm b or firm c rejects the offer of firm a at the beginning of period 1, only the firm who is accepting the offer takes the market-entry decision in period 2. We solve the game by through backward induction.

Proposition 1: *If $\pi_b^1(0, 0) = \pi_c^1(0, 0) > I > \pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0) = \pi_c^1(c_m, 0, 0)$,⁴ firm a offers the following contract to both firms b and c at the beginning of period 1: in both periods 1 and 2, each of firms b and c produces one half of the monopoly output corresponding to zero marginal cost, and each of them pays $\pi_i^1(0)/2$, $i = b, c$, to firm a .⁵ Both firms b and c accept this contract.*

Proof: See Appendix A.

Intuitively, under multi-sourcing, if the market size and the entry-cost are such that the net profits of the suppliers are negative when both of them enter the market in period 2, it creates a coordination problem between the suppliers. Hence, each of them randomizes the entry decision, and the net expected equilibrium profit of each supplier is the same under entry and under no-entry. Thus, even if outsourcing creates knowledge spillover, multi-sourcing prevents entry of the suppliers by creating competition between them, and helps to protect the market of the outsourcing firm from the suppliers.

If the condition in Proposition 1 holds, the profit of firm a under multi-sourcing is the same to that of under no imitation.

⁴ The arguments c_m , 0, and 0 in π_i^1 , $i = b, c$, represents the marginal cost of firms a , b , and c , respectively.

⁵ Note that $\pi_i^t(0) = \pi_j^t(0)$ where $i, j = b, c$, and $i \neq j$.

If the condition in Proposition 1 does not hold but there are large number of potential suppliers, given the market size and the entry-cost, firm a can choose the number of suppliers suitably so that, in the entry game of period 2, the expected equilibrium payoff of each supplier becomes zero, which is the profit of a supplier under no-entry. Hence, by reducing the gross profit of the suppliers, multi-sourcing protects the market of the outsourcing firm by deterring entry of the suppliers.

4. Conclusion

There are ample evidences of multi-sourcing, yet the theoretical literature did not pay much attention to this issue. We provide a strategic reason for multi-sourcing. We show that, in the presence of imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing acts as an entry deterrence strategy by creating an entry game between the suppliers, thus helping the outsourcing firm to extract more profits compared to the case of single outsourcing. In this respect, market size and the cost of entry play important roles.

Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 1: At the beginning of period 2, firms b and c decide simultaneously whether or not to enter the market. The entry-game between firms b and c generates the payoff functions shown in Table 1. In Table 1, the strategies of firms b and c are characterized by E (i.e., entry and breaking the contract with firm a) and NE (i.e., no-entry and continuing the contract with firm a).

Table 1. Payoffs to firms b and c in period 2

		Firm c	
		E	NE
Firm b	E	$(\pi_b^2(c_m, 0, 0) - I, \pi_c^2(c_m, 0, 0) - I)$	$(\pi_b^2(0, 0) - I, 0)$
	NE	$(0, \pi_c^2(0, 0) - I)$	$(0, 0)$

Assume that firms b and c enter (resp. do not enter) the market with probabilities p_b and p_c (resp. $(1 - p_b)$ and $(1 - p_c)$), respectively. The expected payoff of firm b under entry is

$$p_c(\pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0) - I) + (1 - p_c)(\pi_b^1(0, 0) - I), \quad (A1)$$

and its profit is zero if it does not enter the market. Letting (A1) equals to zero, the equilibrium value of p_3 is given by

$$p_c = \frac{\pi_b^1(0, 0) - I}{\pi_b^1(0, 0) - \pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0)}, \quad (A2)$$

where $p_c \in (0, 1)$ for $\pi_b^1(0, 0) = \pi_c^1(0, 0) > I > \pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0) = \pi_c^1(c_m, 0, 0)$.

Similarly, we obtain the equilibrium values of p_b as

$$p_b = \frac{\pi_c^1(0, 0) - I}{\pi_c^1(0, 0) - \pi_c^1(c_m, 0, 0)}, \quad (\text{A3})$$

where $p_c \in (0, 1)$ for $\pi_b^1(0, 0) = \pi_c^1(0, 0) > I > \pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0) = \pi_c^1(c_m, 0, 0)$.

It follows from (A2) and (A3) that, if $\pi_b^1(0, 0) = \pi_c^1(0, 0) > I > \pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0) = \pi_c^1(c_m, 0, 0)$, the expected payoffs of firms b and c in period 2 are

$$(p_b)^2(\pi_b^1(c_m, 0, 0) - I) + p_b(1 - p_b)(\pi_b^1(0, 0) - I) = 0, \quad (\text{A4})$$

and neither firm b nor firm c is better off by breaking up the contract with firm a and entering the market. Since, both firms b and c produce for firm a in both periods, it is optimal for firm a to ask each of them to produce one half of the monopoly output corresponding to zero marginal cost, and to pay $\pi_i^t(0)/2$, $i = b, c$, to firm a . This contract is accepted by both firms b and c , since neither of them can be better off by rejecting it. Q. E. D.

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